Massachusetts Militia Companies and Officers in the Lexington Alarm

Source of this Document: http://www.newenglandancestors.org/database_search/mass_militia_lexington_alarm.asp

 

Edited by
Charles E. Hambrick-Stowe and Donna D. Smerlas

 

Published by

The Society of Colonial Wars in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts

The Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, Archives Division

The New England Historic Genealogical Society

Copyright 1976
by
The New England Historic Genealogical Society

Source Information:

Originally published in book form in by the New England Historic Genealogical Society; the Society of Colonial Wars in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; and the Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Archives Division

The information was originally compiled from such primary sources as colonial military records and muster rolls; colonial land grants; Plymouth Colony records; usurpation (1688-1689) and intercharter (1689-1692) archival records of Massachusetts; and town vital, probate, and court records.

Key to Abbreviations

The following abbreviations were used to classify the "type" of militia company the officer commanded:

mm	minuteman
ml	regular militia
al	alarm list
?	type not given

The raised letters signify:

a	Plus one clerk
b	Plus one doctor and one minister
c	Includes eight post riders, listed but not paid
d	Plus one doctor
e	Plus two captains Serving as volunteers
f	Includes one sergeant-major
g	A "troop of horse": the lieutenant is cornet; the sergeant is quartermaster; fife and drum is trumpet
h	Includes one captain lieutenant
i	Plus nine "old men" and others unable to bear arms who carried provisions
j	Includes three captains, two lieutenants, and one ensign serving as volunteers
k	Listed as major" rather than "captain"
l	Plus nine who "marched off without a proper dismission"
t	Company marched on April 19

 

Introduction

When Thomas Gage-the "mild general," as the king of England derisively called him¹-took up his pen on April 18, 1775, to write the order for the march to Concord, he undoubtedly knew that a page in history was turning. On the following day, the Massachusetts militia mobilized on a scale unprecedented in size in response to Gage's long-delayed action. After the early morning skirmish at Lexington and, as the alarm spread with amazing rapidity, almost simultaneously with the battle of Concord, more than twenty thousand men in arms-"embattled farmers"-gathered into their companies in towns all across Massachusetts (and later in neighboring colonies as well) and marched toward headquarters at Cambridge.

The muster rolls of the April 19th mobilization are stored in the Massachusetts State Archives, and although not quite complete, offer a good picture of what happened that day and who was involved. Two major lists have been compiled from the data given in these rolls. List One is the militia companies that responded to the Lexington Alarm, presented in the order in which the rolls are arranged in the Archives. The nature and composition of the companies are shown under the headings of commanding officer's name, town, type of company (minuteman, regular militia, or alarm), and the various ranks. List Two is the officers, from the rank of ensign to captain, who marched in these companies. It is arranged alphabetically by the officer's name and includes his town, rank, the date he marched, number of days he marched, number of days in service, whether or not he enlisted immediately in the new army, the name of the commanding officer of his company, and when given, his regiment. Every name was cross-checked against Massachusetts Soldiers and Sailors of the Revolutionary War² for accuracy and consistency of reading.

The Event of April 19th
General Gage was commander-in-chief of the king's forces in America, and, to his distress, had also been governor of Massachusetts during the year preceding April 1775. He had honestly tried to avoid what was to happen. A true conciliator, his patience with the rowdy and the revolutionary among the citizens of Boston had forestalled the inevitable clash.

Until late in the summer of 1774 Gage had believed that the excitement would settle down and the people's rage would cool if only disorder could be controlled and the facts of British military strength made clear. But by August he was no longer certain. The intimidation of civil officeholders by the people had resulted in forced resignations and the successful boycott of the whole judiciary process. The failure of the courts and the massive build-up and drilling of the town militias were discouraging signs to Gage. His optimism completely vanished, however, when "he personally tried to break up the town meeting at Salem (where his headquarters were located) with two companies of the 59th Regiment on August 25. The meeting called his bluff, militia swarmed in from neighboring towns, and Gage decided to release the seven men he had ordered arrested by the sheriff."³ Two days later he moved his headquarters to Boston where "he sat in embarrassment with nearly four thousand troops to police the city."⁴

Gage's geographical isolation reinforced his political isolation from the people of Massachusetts. His chief activity-fortifying the city-was defensive. His one foray out of Boston came on September 1 in an early morning move on the powder stored at Charlestown. The march seemed almost a rehearsal for the following spring, although the powder (plus two cannon from Cambridge) were successfully taken. Responding to false rumors of violence and bloodshed, the militia turned out, and "by nightfall half of New England was in motion, marching toward Boston."⁵ Between three and four thousand men had assembled at Cambridge by eight that morning, and "perhaps 6000 men from Worcester county started east before the story was contradicted."⁶

This spirit of insurgency was soon followed by other significant events: the militia men frightened Lieutenant-Governor Andrew Oliver who fled to the safety of Boston. They tried to capture the commissioner of customs who narrowly escaped in a horserace to the British fortifications on the Neck. They forced the sheriff and others to promise nonenforcement of the intolerable laws. And when Oliver returned with Gage's promise not to send the troops out again, he was compelled to resign from the Governor's Council. Gage must have sighed wearily when the militia men, with remarkable orderliness, returned home.

The commander-in-chief was deeply affected by the experience. On September 2, he wrote William Legge, Lord Dartmouth, secretary (of state in charge of the army, "I mean my Lord…to avoid any bloody Crisis as long as possible…His Majesty will in the mean Time Judge what is best to be done…Nothing can be done but by forceable Means. Tho' the People are not held in high Estimation by the Troops, yet they are numerous, worked up to a Fury, and not the Boston Rabble but the Freeholders and the Farmers of the Country."⁷ Thus by fall 1774, Gage knew that a crisis was mounting.

The fall and winter worked to the advantage of the people and against British rule. With the passage of the hold Suffolk Resolves⁸ and the establishment of the Provincial Congress and its Committee of Safety,⁹ the Americans had taken specific action to raise an army to pit against the British. The Provincial Congress also set up a Committee of Supplies to gather tools, weapons, and food for use in a state of emergency. The Continental Congress, with Samuel Adams, John Adams, and John Hancock in attendance, voted approval and support of the moves of the Provincial Congress. The delegates in Philadelphia agreed that if it came to force "all America ought to support them in their opposition."¹⁰ And finally the Massachusetts militia was busy preparing for conflict.

During this period of American mobilization, Gage was in an extremely uncomfortable position. Smarting from the news of the Suffolk Resolves, he pondered his course of action, while letting rebel leaders, including Dr. Joseph Warren and Paul Revere, come and go freely in Boston. People and arms were able to slip out over the Neck, beyond his authority. Gage's disciplinarian approach with his own men and his indulgent attitude toward the citizens of Boston weakened the morale of the regulars and deepened their hostility toward Americans and Gage himself. Desertion became common. To complicate matters, smallpox struck the city.¹¹ Gage's passive posture prevented him from capturing the entire rebel leadership gathered in Old South Church to hear the annual Boston Massacre oration. Dr. Warren himself spoke on "The Baleful Influence of Standing Armies in Time of Peace."¹² As the leaders acted and spoke with impunity, most British onlookers were reinforced in their opinion that Gage was indeed ineffectual.

Tory Marshfield, where Gage had marched troops in January, was his only toehold outside Boston. On February 26 he sent troops to Salem to seize cannon. The result: an aroused country and a retreat to Boston, "defeated and chagrined," as the Reverend Jonas Clark would put it in his April 19, 1776, sermon.¹³ The situation appeared, both to Gage's men and to London officials, to be just beyond the governor's grasp. Gage further angered his superiors, including the king, when he asked secretary of war, Viscount William Barrington, for more troops, declaring, "If you will resist and not yield, that Resistance should be effectual at the Beginning. If you think ten thousand men sufficient, send twenty, if one million is thought enough, give two; you will save both Blood and Treasure in the end. A large Force will terrify, and engage many to join you, a middling one will encourage Resistance and gain no friends."¹⁴ He was still waiting for reinforcements in May, when the Cerberus brought three major-generals, William Howe, John Burgoyne, and Henry Clinton. These three top dogs-to appropriate the pun of a London wit of the day-might be able to bark, but meanwhile the Americans had demonstrated their ability to bite.¹⁵

Three developments in early April brought General Gage's problem to ahead. First, the Provincial Congress began to reorganize the militia system into a regular army. All the companies, including the newly formed minuteman companies, were to be consolidated and centralized, and officers were to he appointed from the top (not elected locally, as in the traditional militia). The Congress also voted to send delegations to the other New England Colonies to secure their assistance. Complete details of the reorganization were not yet settled when the Congress adjourned on April 15, but a beginning had been made.¹⁶

The decision of the Provincial Congress was the latest in a series of moves which marked the steady improvement of the Massachusetts militia system. During the summer and fall of 1774 the men in every Massachusetts town prepared for battle by intensified drilling. Ensign DeBerniere, sent on a scouting expedition into the countryside by General Gage, was impressed and even intimidated when he witnessed the Framingham militia drilling on the green, for "there was no pretence that the preparation was not against the regulars."¹⁷ Further, in September the process of upgrading and standardizing the companies as organizational units was begun. The delegates to the Worcester County convention, responding to the presence of Tories in positions of leadership in the militia and to a fear of inability to mobilize quickly, issued the following revisions to the county militia system: "All militia officers were told to resign their commissions and the field officers (who held royal commissions) were directed to publish their resignations in the Boston newspapers. The people of the towns were advised to elect their own militia officers, and each town to provide itself with one or more field pieces and ammunition."¹⁸ This was indeed a revolutionary act: a purge.¹⁹ In their September 20 meeting the delegates ordered that the best of the militia men between the ages of sixteen and sixty be taken from their old companies to form new ones, charged with the responsibility to respond "at a minute's warning"- minutemen.²⁰ The Provincial Congress followed the lead of the Worcester County convention and encouraged the process of purge, new elections, and establishment of minute companies throughout Massachusetts. It was a slow business, not entirely complete by April 19. It became especially difficult for the regular companies, out of which the minutemen were chosen, to reorganize themselves uniformly. The analysis of the April 19 muster rolls shows the extent of these reforms when the entire system was pressed into action.

Finally, the indispensable complement to the intensive drilling of the local militia and to the organizational reform of the system was the communication system of couriers on horseback. Typified by Paul Revere and William Dawes, it was well organized. Word of any provocative movement by Gage would be widely known within hours.

Gage knew that the militia system in any stage of preparedness was nothing with which to trifle. News that the Provincial Congress had decided to transform it into a regular army was an incentive to act quickly. The more efficient the Massachusetts fighting force became, the more Gage feared losing whatever relative strength he had with his professional army.

Second Gage received a letter on April 14 from Lord Dartmouth²¹ who ordered him to take positive action against the rebels:

The only consideration that remains is, in what manner the Force under your command may be exerted…The first essential step to be taken towards re-establishing Government, would be to arrest and imprison the principal Actors and Abettors in the Provincial Congress …Any efforts of the people, unprepared to encounter with a regular Force, cannot be very formidable, and tho' such a proceeding should be, according to your idea of it, a signal for hostilities yet…it will surely be better that the Conflict should be brought on, upon such ground, than in a riper state of Rebellion.²²

But the Provincial Congress met outside of Boston-that is, outside Gage's domain-and Gage was reluctant to arrest the leaders who lived in Boston. On April 8 colonial spies brought word from two vessels docked at Marblehead that danger was afoot. That evening many rebel leaders suddenly slipped out of Boston. This sudden evacuation confused Gage until, on receiving Dartmouth's letter, he realized that via their intelligence system the colonists had gotten the news from London before he had.²³ But whatever move Gage chose to make, the Dartmouth letter "clearly demanded some military action.²⁴

The third development determined the nature of that action. Gage had earlier sent two of his officers, Captain Brown and Ensign DeBerniere, on a scouting expedition into the countryside. Although it proved to have comic elements-including disguises that fooled no-one-it provided Gage with information about military stores and food stockpiled by the Provincial Congress at Concord.²⁵

In these three developments came the catalyst and the focus for General Gage's action. Although he was to be surprised by its magnitude, he knew what would result. But he had already delayed too long. In mid-April, with the military system in a state of transition and with pressure from London unmistakable, Gage acted.

Sir: You will march with the corps of Grenadiers and Light Infantry put under your command with the utmost expedition and secrecy to Concord, where you will seize and destroy all the artillery and ammunition you can find ²⁶

The die is as cast.

The unfolding of that event of April 19 now seems almost inevitable. Colonel Smith and his twenty-one companies (about 750 men)²⁷ set out late at night for Concord-as do Revere and Dawes. The regulars are delayed for several precious hours after crossing the Charles River and finally begin the march from Cambridge to Concord. In Lexington, where Samuel Adams and Hancock have been staying and have slipped away only that evening, word of Smith's advance reaches the militia leaders. Smith sends an advance group of six companies of light infantry under Major Pitcairn to secure the bridges at Concord. The major and his men move on to Lexington where by now Captain John Parker's minuteman company has assembled on the green, with orders to avoid confrontation with the regulars. Such avoidance is impossible: the two sides stand opposite each other, the Americans outnumbered, perhaps 400 to 70. In the confusion, as Pitcairn vainly attempts to curb his men's hostility toward the armed Americans, shots are fired. It is unclear which side shoots first, but eight Americans are killed and ten are wounded. One regular and Major Pitcairn's horse are wounded on the British side.²⁸ The Lexington minutemen withdraw. With such high casualties, the first of the war, they and the town are shaken. But they will regroup and meet the British on their return march. The word that blood was shed in Lexington is broadcast across the countryside. Militia companies from nearby towns begin to assemble and march.

At Concord the British seize what military stores they can find, although most have been carted away. There is no fighting until the combined forces of companies from Concord, Acton, Lincoln, and Bedford move down the hill to take the North Bridge. The regulars fire, killing two men; the Americans kill three, wound nine. With militia companies from other nearby towns beginning to converge on Concord, about noon Smith orders his men to return to Boston. For the British the worst is to come. The Americans spontaneously form "a bloody chute"²⁹-a gauntlet through which the tired regulars are forced to march, easy targets for American snipers fighting like Indians from behind trees, barns, and houses. From Concord on, "every hour increased their numbers, or brought the men from distant towns nearer to the line of British retreat."³⁰ Fighting worsens at Miriam's Corner where men from the companies that took the bridge, plus those from Reading, Billerica, and East Sudbury converge; at Lincoln where Framingham and Woburn join the action; at Lexington again; and at Menotomy where by now hundreds of Americans have arrived. Smith is saved by the arrival at Lexington of Lord Hugh Percy, with 900 reinforcements. In retreat the British take the shortest path to Charlestown and safety, thereby thwarting a plan of General William Heath to confront them at Cambridge. Total casualties for the British: 70 men killed, 165 wounded, 26 missing; for the Americans, 93 men killed and wounded.³¹ About 3,500 American militia men were involved in the fighting.³²

All over New England the courier system had carried word of the clashes at Lexington and Concord. Not only the 3,500 men "from every Middlesex village and farm," but militia companies from even many days march away were already or would soon be in motion. One author romantically describes what happened:

Nothing can be more certain, in the story of the beginning of the Revolution, than the spontaneity of the provincial call to arms. From the time when Revere and Dawes began their summons in the night, messengers, first a few and then dozens, took up the news of the British march, spread the warning and appeal from farm to farm. And from the time when horrified spectators shrank back from the sight of the dead on Lexington Green, there went out a second cry to all New England. Riders hurried from town to town. The crash of that British volley spread in waves in all directions, ever wider and yet not weaker, rousing in every corner great horror, anger, and resolution, until it crossed the Hudson.³³

One courier, Israel Bissel, a postal rider by profession, traveled from Watertown to Worcester in two hours, then to towns in Connecticut and New York, and finally to Philadelphia in five days.³⁴ It was in response to this widespread alarm that the approximately 20,000 men listed on the muster rolls which are our data-plus others not included in the Archives collection of rolls-marched. Only one-seventh of those took part in the fighting on April 19. But they all marched in response to "the Alarm occasioned by the Lexington battle on April 19, 1775."³⁵

In a narrow sense, the event of the nineteenth involved only the fighting of 3,500 men. In a larger sense, however, it mobilized the militia on a scale which overwhelmed Gage and posed immediate organizational difficulties for the Provincial Congress.

Muster rolls for 441 companies are in the Massachusetts Archives. In general these companies, according to the information on the rolls themselves, marched "to the place of rendezvous"-either to Cambridge or Roxbury-on the alarm. Companies from nearby towns-Woburn, for example-marched first "to Concord and from thence to Cambridge."³⁶ While marching to the "place of rendezvous," the militia companies accomplished an unexpected feat. They drove the British back into Boston. In the enthusiasm of having the British on the run and in following out their orders to march to headquarters, the men began the siege of Boston. General Gage, fearfully watching the flickering campfires grow in number around the city and slowly realizing that the militia men were not returning to their hometowns, unnecessarily abandoned Charlestown on April 20. British troops were still occupying Marshfield, yet this position was also evacuated. In the muster rolls, a large number of companies from Plymouth and Barnstable counties, under Colonels John Bailey and Theophilus Cotton, are shown to have marched not to Cambridge but to nearby Marshfield. Their orders were to overcome the regulars (about 100 men) there under Balfour. But Cotton and Bailey were cautious and refused to attack until General John Thomas, who had gone ahead to Roxbury, came back to lead them. In a letter written to General Thomas on April 21, Cotton and Bailey admit that their caution was the result of inexperience. As a result, the British soldiers and the Loyalists eager to flee escaped by ship to Boston before the 1,100 men Thomas sent could reach Marshfield.³⁷ The Marshfield episode has been described as an American blunder, but the larger result was the completion of the siege. The British were contained on the tiny Shawmut peninsula. Of the 441 companies, 324 (73.5 percent) of them give April 19 as their marching date. The rest give either the 20th or 21st (towns-in the western or extreme southeastern part of the colony marched later simply because it took longer for them to receive word) or no date at all. Thus, the surprising power with which the siege was begun was due in large measure to the enormous numbers of men that literally poured into Cambridge and Roxbury.³⁸

As intimidated as the British evidently were by being suddenly surrounded by 20,000 armed men, the American problem of managing the men and companies was vast. The 441 companies were under the command at the regimental level of more than fifty-eight colonels,³⁹ but many of these officers may not have responded to the Alarm. Of the generals (who also held the rank of colonel in command of a regiment), Artemas Ward was ill on April 19, Seth Pomeroy did not respond, Jedediah Preble had probably resigned, and John Whitcomb was delayed by personal problems. Only General Heath appears in the accounts of the event of the 19th itself. On the 20th Ward and Thomas were in Cambridge and Roxbury, respectively, commanding the troops, but the picture of leadership above the rank of captain is cloudy. Colonel Thomas Pickering of Salem was so reluctant to march on the morning of the 19th that his men became angry. One company of his regiment from Danvers marched out alone and joined the fighting at Menotomy, but Pickering did not come near the action. He finally arrived with his men in Cambridge, but then angrily went home on the 20th because he disagreed with the decision of Ward and Thomas to keep the siege going.⁴⁰ The situation in Cambridge and Roxbury was plagued by weak leadership at the highest levels, in spite of the undoubted ability of Ward, Heath, and Thomas. Since both the strength and the weakness of the militia system was its inextricable connection with the town, the immediate task of the highest officers present was almost impossible to achieve. Under the surface unity-which the British had fled-lay a more basic localism.

The real challenge to Ward and the other generals as well as to the Provincial Congress, in maintaining the siege, was to form plans for the new army. But the situation in Cambridge and Roxbury was very much in flux, making organization of any kind difficult. Companies continued to arrive during the first week of the siege, while others left for home. The problems of holding the men in camp were often acute. List Two shows that many officers stayed in service for a few days. Twenty thousand men had been willing to lay down their plows on April 19, but as time passed, most of them wished to return to their farms or businesses. Some simply deserted, as did the nine in Moses Stone's Sudbury company "who marched off without a proper dismission."⁴¹ Others went with permission given reluctantly.⁴² A random sample of 50 out of 1,240 officers reveals that 32 percent left for home within the first week; 74 percent were gone by the end of the second week (see Chart 1). On April 22, Thomas wrote his wife that there were about 5,000 men with him in Roxbury and approximately the same number in Cambridge.⁴³ With companies from the western and extreme southeastern parts of the colony still to arrive, Thomas's estimate is not far from the figures shown in Chart 1. On April 24, with the New Hampshire companies returning and Massachusetts men dribbling off, Ward wrote the Provincial Congress: "My situation is such, that if I have not enlisting orders immediately, I shall be left all alone. It is impossible to keep the men here, excepting something be done. I therefore pray that the plan may be completed and handed to me this morning, and that you, gentlemen of the Congress, issue orders for enlisting men."⁴⁴ Congress obliged. The order was to enlist men into the new army under the procedures established in early April, and the emphasis was to be placed on enlisting minutemen.⁴⁵

How many men actually enlisted without going home first? The data show that 261 officers (21 percent of the total) enlisted without returning home,⁴⁶ and many others returned with their companies periodically to reinforce the siege. Investigation of the further military activity of the 50 sample officers reveals that 66 percent, were recorded as fighting against the British after the initial April 19 mobilization (see Chart 2). As the chart clearly shows, all officers who later joined the Continental Army had further service before George Washington arrived in Cambridge. It seems likely that many of the 34 percent for whom no further activity is recorded in Massachusetts Soldiers and Sailors (which is based solely on records extant in the Archives) also returned to headquarters for further service as well. Although 80 percent of the officers had left for home before the end of three weeks (Chart 1), most of them returned to service for varying periods during the siege.⁴⁷ But actual enlistments for definite periods of service were low, and this reliance on the town militia companies was far from satisfactory.

Dr. Warren played an active role in attempting to establish the army. On April 20 he sent out a circular urging popular support for the army, and on the 21st, under his leadership, the Committee of Safety voted to raise an army of 8,000.⁴⁸ Reassembled in Watertown, the Provincial Congress endorsed the Committee of Safety vote on April 23: "Resolved, unanimously, that it is necessary, for the defence of the Colony that an Army of 30,000 Men be immediately raised and established. Resolved, That 13,600 Men be raised immediately by this Province."⁴⁹ However, these resolves did not overcome the problems headquarters was experiencing, and Ward continued to be frustrated. On May 7, Dr. Warren wrote to John Adams, "As to the Army, it is in such a shifting, fluctuating state as not to be capable of a perfect regulation."⁵⁰ Eight weeks later the Committee of Safety still complained that "the Province was in the utmost danger for want of men, the Committee not being able to prevail on the Militia and Minute-men to tarry in camp."⁵¹ So this is the emerging pattern: only 21 percent of the officers enlisted, while others returned to Cambridge with their companies when they were needed and were able to leave their farms or jobs.

Chart 1: Duration of Service of Fifty Selected Officers

Days

	1-7	8-14	15-21	22 or more
Number of Men	16	21	3	10
Percentage	32	42	6	20

 

Chart 2: Additional Military Service of Fifty Selected Officers

	Further Mass. Militia or Army Service	Continental Army Service	No Further Service Recorded
Number of Men	33	6	17
Percentage	66	12	34

 

 

Still, there was an army, and there was the militia to back it up. Two months later the Americans proved their fighting ability again at Bunker Hill, more decisively than they had done at Lexington and Concord. The siege continued. "In the end here was an army raised by Massachusetts alone, without help from the continent." When Washington arrived on the second of July, the Massachusetts Army, such as it was, was at his service."⁵² Although the general described the group as "this mixed multitude of people,"⁵³ the original core of his army came from these men who had first responded to the Lexington Alarm.

Washington's difficulties in raising and maintaining the army are well known. His problem, as Ward's had been, was rooted in the militia system. A town institution, it reflected both the strengths and weaknesses of the town mentality, and men with farms, families, responsibilities, and long-standing grudges against regular armies were reluctant to leave their militia companies. Chart 2 shows that only 12 percent of the officers in the sample ever joined the Continental Army. The town militia continued as a major institution throughout the Revolution.

The Muster Rolls

Except for the rolls of eight companies which are only available in the original, the muster rolls which are the basis of the data were studied on microfilm at the Archives. They are in relatively good condition and, although some individuals' names are difficult to decipher, generally easy to read. They are kept largely in three volumes-XI, XII, and XIII-of the Revolutionary Rolls and are arranged in rough alphabetical order under the captain of the company's name. The eight companies' rolls which are found in other volumes are in volumes XIV to XVII and XX.

How complete are the muster rolls? There are two levels at which to look at this problem. First, a few individual rolls have been damaged over time so that not all the names have been preserved. In some cases the edges of the roll have decayed so that first names written close to the edge, are often unreadable. In other cases the bottom portion of the roll has worn off so that the names of some privates have been lost. The ink has faded on some rolls making reading difficult, and in two of the 441 companies' rolls, it has faded to the point of illegibility. Thus, the number of companies used in most of the analysis is 439. If the loss from decay has had any effect, it would he in the count of company size in List One rather than in the listing of officers in List Two. But the number lost appears to be so small that any difference in the figures from the original is negligible.

Second, how complete are the rolls in the larger sense of the number of companies that marched in response to the Lexington Alarm? This is more difficult to determine. Some of the most important participants in the event are not included in the data. Captain John Parker's name is not on the lists. The first activity for which an extant muster roll was filed by Parker, listed in Massachusetts Soldiers and Sailors, is for service during the siege: "John Parker. Captain in Command of a Detachment from Lexington militia Company; service, 5 days; detachment reported on command from May 6 to May 10, 1775, by order of the Committee of Safety."⁵⁴ Likewise, the Concord companies under Captains David Brown, Charles Miles, and Nathan Barrett are not represented. Nor are those of Jonathan Wilson of Bedford, Isaac Davis of Acton (who was killed at Concord), and John Brooks of Reading.⁵⁵ These are significant gaps.

One explanation for the absence of muster rolls of these companies is that the towns themselves paid their militiamen.⁵⁶ Although this is surely possible, it is difficult to imagine why the towns would do so, since the Provincial Congress had authorized payment. Would local pride be carried to such an extent? Another possible explanation is that some companies did not file muster rolls. This does not seem any more likely, however, for pecuniary reasons. Since the pay of their men was at stake, there was great incentive for captains to complete and file the muster rolls. A captain who was slow about completing his roll was undoubtedly prodded by his men until he did so. Thus, financial incentive tends to work toward the completeness of the data.⁵⁷ The most obvious explanation of the gaps is simply loss of the material through the years before it was lodged in the Archives.

The completeness of the data can, perhaps, only be answered by the coordinated efforts of local historians. Internal evidence indicates, however, that it is nearly complete. For instance, one company under Asa Whitcomb noted on its muster roll that the colonel had thirteen companies under him, and data for eleven is available. Therefore, either the two remaining companies did not march, marched and filed a roll but did not give the name of their colonel (many did not), marched but did not file a roll, or marched and filed a roll which is not extant. Considering all these possibilities, eleven out of thirteen is a high percentage. Although the lists presented here are not complete, based as they are on the muster rolls in the Archives, and although local researchers will discover gaps immediately, the data is nearly complete.

There is much information given on the muster rolls. Typically, across the top of the paper is written an introduction to the roll which gives the captain's (or other commanding officer's) name, the date marched, and the reason for marching. Some rolls also give the name of the colonel of the regiment to which the company belonged and others give the place of rendezvous as well. Examples of the introductory style are as follows:

A pay roll of Capt. Ebenr. Withingtons Company who mustered on the Nineteenth of April In Defense of the Lifes & Property of the Inhabitants of this Colony.⁵⁸

A Muster roll of Capt. Edward Cobb's Company in Colo. Edward Mitchells Regt. of Militia who marched to Marshfield April 20th 1775.⁵⁹

A pay Roll of a Company of Minute Men, under the Command of Capt. John Clapp, who marched on the Lexington Alarm, April 19th, 1775 In the Regiment commanded by Coll. John Bailey.⁶⁰

A Roll of the Travil and service of Capt. Saml. Dauglass of Townshend in the County of Middlesex and belonging to Colo. James Prescotts Regt. and also of the men under his Command who in Consequence of the Alarm made on the 19th of April 1775 march'd from home for the defence of this Colony against the Ministerial Troops and continu'd in the Service till order'd back to take care of the Tories in sd. Townshend.⁶¹

The body of the roll consists of columns listing the men's names and towns, the date marched (if not given in the introduction), the days in service, the miles traveled in the round trip, the pay for days in service, the pay for travel, and the total pay.

The reason for filing the muster rolls was to receive pay from the colony for the men. Chapter 370 of the Resolves of the Provincial Congress, entitled "Resolves providing pay for the militia who came on the alarm at Lexington," was passed November 9, 1775, and it fixed the rates of pay and the process by which it could be received. All those who were in command of a company were directed

to make up a Roll of the Travel, and Service of himself, and the said Men under his Command who did not inlist into the Colony Army, and therein exhibit the Number of miles which each Man Travelled from, and to his Home at one penny per mile for the Expence of travelling; and also the Time which each man was in Service, computing from the Timc he left Home to the Time he left the place of Rendezvous; and also allowing one Day for each Twenty Miles from said place of Rendezvous to his Home, and with Regard to such Men as Marched as aforesaid and inlisted into) the Army, each Captain, or other Officer as aforesaid is respectively directed to exhibit in his Roll the Time of such Mens Service, computing from the Time they left their respective Homes to the Time they inlisted into said Army without exhibiting their Travel as that is already order'd to be inserted to in the Rolls, which the Officers under whom such men inlisted are directed to make up, and return.⁶²

The captains and other commanding officers who filed the rolls followed this process fairly faithfully. Some rolls-for example, those for Greenfield (XIII: 162), Northbridge (XIII:163), Northboro (XIII:165), and Fitchburg (XIII:169)-are divided into two sections: the men who enlisted in the new army soon after arriving at headquarters and those who returned home without enlisting. Other muster rolls show the word "enlisted" after the names of some men in place of the travel money column. As set out in the resolve, only those who did not enlist received travel money. Captain Phinehas Moore of Paxton stated it explicitly on his roll: "Those that are not made up for travel in this roll inlisted with the Province Army when they had served under me the number of days herein inscribed."⁶³ The receipt of travel money, where enlistment was not explicitly stated in the roll, is the basis for the determination in List Two of who did and did not enlist.

The pay scale passed in the November 9 resolution was:⁶⁴

Captain	£6.00 per lunar month
Lieutenant, 1st	4.00
Lieutenant, 2nd	3.10
Ensign	3.10
Sergeant	2.80
Corporal	2.40
Fife and Drum	2.40
Private	2.00

This scale is followed in the muster rolls. Clerks, in those few usually large, companies that had them, received the same pay as sergeant. The unusual rank of sergeant-major, although at the top of the sergeant rank, received the same pay as a normal sergeant. In the "troop of horse," the rank of cornet corresponded with ensign, and that officer received £3.1, while the quartermaster, although roughly equivalent with sergeant, received £3.0.⁶⁵

Captain Samuel Sibley of Sutton, although he never reached Cambridge, reveals something of the muster-roll-making and payment process in this notation on his roll:

In compliance to a Resolve past by the Great General Court of this Colony Ordering the several commanding officers of Companies to make up Pay Roles for their respective companies that went on the alarm against the Ministerial Troops in April 1775 This Company marched from Sutton the 21st day of April under Captain Samuel Sibley, and went as far as Braintree and boar the whole of their Expenses while absent from Home.⁶⁶

And Captain Gershom Nelson of Mendon is even more explicit in his introduction:

This is an exact Muster Roll of the names of the officers and soldiers in Captain Gershom Nelsons Company who marched from Mendon to Cambridge and Roxbury on the 19th day of April 1775 at the Alarm of the battle of Lexington in defence of this colony, with an account of the number of miles they travelled out and home at 1 d per mile and the number of days each man spent in the service agreeable to the Establishment made at Watertown in April last to establish the soldiers pay in the army.⁶⁷

The Provincial Congress further directed the commanding officers

to make up said Rolls as soon as may be, and lodge them in the Secretarys office for the consideration of this Court; and the Payment of the Contents of all the said Rolls shall be stayed untill the Accounts of the Innholders and others who afforded Entertainment, or money to bear their Expenses to the Men, borne on said Rolls in their March to, and from the place or places of Rendezvous, shall be preferred, and considered by this Court: and all persons having such Demands, are directed to exhibit their Accounts to this Court on or before the 20th day of December next.⁶⁸

The payment process is further clarified by information on the rolls themselves. The commanding officer made out his roll in late 1775 or early 1776 and took it to the justice of the peace of his county. A copy was made for the use of the province, and it was given to the justice. It is this copy which is now in the Archives-presumably the original remained with the captain. The captain made "solemn oath that this roll by him subscribed is true in all its parts according to the best of his knowledge," whereupon the justice of the peace wrote on the bottom, back, or margin of the roll and copy that the captain had so sworn and then signed his name. The captain next took the signed and dated document and copy to Watertown where "The Committee appointed to approve Muster Rolls" compared the roll and the copy and affirmed in writing, again on the bottom or margin, that "this is a True Copy of the Original" and signed their names. The copy was then taken to the Provincial Congress where payment in the amount requested was approved. On all the muster rolls appear these or similar words: "In Council (date) read and allowed and ordered that a warrent be drawn on the treasury for (amount) in full of said roll," and signed by Perez Morton, treasurer.

Although this process could take less than four weeks to complete, generally it took from one to two months. Typically the captain first appeared before the justice of the peace in late December, and Morton had signed the roll by early February. The latest any roll was signed was a year after the event, at the end of April 1776. How long it took for the money to be disbursed, first to the captain and then to the men, is impossible to tell.

There are several instances of rolls passing through part of the process only to he returned to the captain as inadequate-a signature missing, the form used in making the roll wrong, or some vital piece of information left out. The captain then made a new roll and resubmitted it. For example, Captain Elisha Whitney of Ipswich included his company's entire activity from April 19 to May 1 involving several marches to different destinations, only to have the roll returned with instructions to submit separate rolls for each march.⁶⁹ Congress wanted to keep the April 19 march separate from subsequent militia activity. Similarly, Captain Peter Talbot of Stoughton failed to include the officers in his muster roll, had it returned, submitted a correct roll, and had it approved.⁷⁰

In conclusion, the muster rolls give the name, rank, town, date marched, days in service, receipt of travel money or not (i.e. whether the man enlisted or not), company, and in many cases, regiment. There is no other personal information given. It might be possible, however, to infer the competence of the commanding officer in preparing the roll. Some rolls exhibit the handwriting and ability of a man with education and experience with paper work, for the list is sophisticated and clear, with expertly-made columns, explanations, and totals. Other rolls are messy and poorly organized, with crude handwriting and spelling ability-the product of a person unaccustomed to paper work, one who usually worked with his hands rather than at a desk. Unfortunately the two extremes fade into each other in the middle. It would be difficult to generalize beyond the simple observation that the extremes do exist. Investigators interested in specific commanding officers, however, might benefit from a look at their man's particular roll.

The Militia

The militia system in Massachusetts, although in transition in April 1775, was prepared to meet the regulars in terms of drill and morale. Colonel Timothy Pickering, in contrast with the overall response of the local companies, stands out for his lack of energy. The exception proves the rule. In his incisive study of the militia in the seventeenth century, Darrett Rutnam noted that the "militia is merely the institutionalization of the armed civilian-the militiaman-and effective militiamen must have what I have sometimes termed a 'militia spirit,' a 'will' capable of carrying the citizen-in-arms through adversity and the strangeness of military discipline to success."⁷¹ Clearly, the militiamen who turned out on April 19 had this "militia spirit." This "will" enabled the Lexington minutemen under Captain Parker to regroup and to march out again to meet the British as they retreated down the Lexington Road. This is the force that brought over twenty thousand men into Cambridge, Roxbury, and Marshfield on April 19 and the days that followed.

The militia spirit that pervaded Massachusetts in 1775 had two healthy tap roots. One of these was the tradition of the militia itself. Formed in order to meet the demands of the "tough, crude, hostile new world," the militia had existed as a vital and integral part of colonial life, hand in hand with the church and town organizations, since the1620s. Just as the original ideal was for each town to have one church, so each was to have its militia company. And just as in congregational church polity the people elected the minister and teacher, so from the start did the militiamen elect their officer's.⁷² Sumner Chilton Powell points to the role of the "central government" in the establishment of "military companies in each town," but also affirms the essentially town nature of the system. Although the United Colonies were formed in 1643 as a defensive measure against the Indians and the Dutch, and although "the General Court…appointed a War Council in Massachusetts, with a hierarchy of officers" and organized the local companies into units, still "the burden of responsibility lay squarely on the citizen army, armed and maintained by each town, and principally commanded by various town officers."⁷³ John Shy asserts that the interlocking relationship between religion and politics in the town made the militia a strong institution in Massachusetts. It was not an artificial construct, but an intrinsic part of the New England way.⁷⁴ T. H. Breen, in tracing the early development of the militia, states that "like the Congregational church and the New England town meeting, the trainband was a covenanted organization based on voluntarism."⁷⁵

Previously New England society in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries has been viewed in terms of the church and the civil government as poles of power. Puritan theory itself spoke in these terms. But the functional model which now presents itself is that of a triangle of local power. The three points of the triangle represent the three major institutions in town life-the church, the government, and the militia. The mutual reinforcement between church and civil authority actually extended to militia leadership as well. At everyday level ministers frequently dined with both magistrates and officers in the militia, and the officers were active in church and civil life.⁷⁶ In addition, the social integration that existed in the New England town was achieved at least in part by the organic unity of these three institutions. Thus Rutman connected the "religious militancy and supreme self-confidence" of the colonists with the "militia spirit," contending that the concept of "saints in arms" was not foreign to early American society.⁷⁷ And Shy concurs writing that "the cohesive and disciplined atmosphere of the town, a product of its religious and social origins, enabled Boston to wage war as Jamestown never could."⁷⁸ It was natural that in the days leading up to April 1775 that ministers should become "recruiting officers," lending evangelical fervor to the call to arms. Frequently, too, ministers, would serve in the militia as chaplains or as soldiers.⁷⁹

The colonial militia, although connected by tradition to the militia of early seventeenth-century England, had a uniquely American character. By the 1620s and 1630s the English institution had long since atrophied. Rutman contrasts the sloppy, laughable English militia at which William Shakespeare poked fun with "the emergence of an energetic militia structure on the American continent-one far more highly developed than the English militia the colonists knew at home."⁸⁰ Further, the English militia never had the range and depth of officer strength which the New England companies had from the beginning.⁸¹ By 1640 the militia system had been institutionalized in colonial law, and over the course of the first 155 years of New England history, it was the militia that formed the people's defense against intruders, be they Indian or European.⁸²

During the battles in the French and Indian War the American militiamen and the British officers often fought side by side. Many times these regulars harshly criticized the American fighting men's performance. General James Wolfe derided the American Rangers as "the worst soldiers in the universe"; James Murray contended that "the native American is a very effiminate thing, very unfit for and very impatient of war"; and Piers MacKesy, a British historian, has more recently asserted that "the colonials had lost confidence in their ability to face the French regulars and the disciplined Canadian militia."⁸³ This impression of the militia's capability led to British complacency on the eve of Lexington and Concord.

Shy has suggested that the Americans who incurred the disdain of the British during the previous war were not members of the town militia at all. They were, rather, a lower class of colonists who had been impressed and forced to serve, as in European wars. The militia system, far from having decayed, was still a healthy town institution.⁸⁴ As British laws and the presence of the army became more and more of a perceived menace to American life in the years approaching 1775, it was through the militia that New England prepared to meet the challenge. Fully under Whig leadership after the purge of Tory officers in 1774, the militia was a true people's army. In this light the militia officer's speech to his men in Framingham, overheard by DeBerniere on his foray into the countryside, has great significance. DeBerniere wrote in his diary:

We arrived at Buckminister's tavern about six o'clock that evening, the company of militia were exercising near the house, and an hour after they came and performed their feats before the windows of the room we were in; we did not feel very easy at seeing such a number so near us; however, they did not know who we were, and took little or no notice of us. -After they had done their exercise, one of their commanders spoke a very eloquent speech, recommending patience, coolness, and bravery, (which indeed they very much wanted) particularly told them they would always conquer if they did not break, and recommended them to charge us cooly, and wait for our fire, and everything would succeed with them-quotes Caesar and Pompey, brigadiers Putnam and Ward, and all such great men; put them in mind of Cape Breton, and all the battles they had gained for his majesty last war, and observed that the regulars must have been ruined but for them.-After so learned and spirited a harangue, he dismissed the parade, and the whole company came into the house and drank until nine o'clock, and then returned to their respective homes full of pot-valour.⁸⁵

Sarcasm aside, this is indeed the picture of preparedness, determination, and "spirit" in the sense Rutman describes. In 1775 the tradition of the militia as a potent force was alive.

The second tap root which nourished the militia spirit was the strong feeling in Massachusetts against the presence of the British standing army. Shy believes that this presence, born of "the decision of 1763" to keep troops in America, was the most important cause of the Revolution.⁸⁶ The resentment of being occupied, the parade of corruption, luxury, and debauchery by British officers and men, and the sense that former freedom had been lost contributed substantially to an anti-army sentiment. The experience of official British oppression through the Intolerable Acts mixed with the experience of subjection at the hands of the professional army and produced sentiment against the army simply as an army. The roots of feeling ran deep. As early as 1755, the Massachusetts General Court ironically had petitioned for British troops to be sent on the grounds that "our people are not calculated to be confined in garrisons or kept in any particular service; they soon grow troublesome and uneasy by reflecting on their folly in bringing themselves into a state of subjection when they might have continued free and independent."⁸⁷ Enthusiasm for the war against Britain did not change the American attitude. Washington never succeeded in creating a regular army, although he struggled to do that just as hard as he struggled against the British. Typifying the American sentiment, one delegate to the Continental Congress actually declared that "long enlistment is a state of slavery."⁸⁸

The combination of these feelings against a standing army and the spectacle of having one on police duty in Boston with all the attendant licentiousness was food for the militia spirit. In contrast to a regular army which represented some remote power, composed of professionals committed to doing a job rather than fighting for principles, the town militia system represented freedom and personal commitment in the minds of the colonists. Their soldiers were also citizens who had no leisure time to wile away in barracks and taverns. Respectable townsmen, they had no interest in prostitutes and revelry or, at least, not to the extent that the regulars demonstrated. Although paid for their time in service, they lived primarily on the land or by their trade. And perhaps most important, when they did mobilize, it was always in defense of the way of life which had developed in America apart from the mother country. Contrary to the standing British army of professionals, the militia would not only fight for freedom, but also would provide a free way of fighting.

When James Lovell, the March 5th orator of 1771, asserted that "the true strength and safety of every commonwealth or limited monarchy is the bravery of its freeholders, its militia,"⁸⁹ he was affirming both tap roots. He was celebrating in true patriotic manner the militia tradition of a century-and-a-half, and at the same time he was denouncing the presence of the British army. His words were in effect a call to arms, a rallying cry. As all the forces and factors came to a head in April 1775, the response of the militia was overwhelming.

The data presented in Lists One and Two in this volume enable a thorough analysis of the companies that marched in response to the alarm of April 19. In accordance with the militia reforms begun in 1774, there were three basic types of companies in existence under the general rubric of "the militia" in April 1775:

(1) Minuteman Companies. At the top of the system were the elite regiments of minute companies. The first Provincial Congress officially called for their establishment on October 26, 1774. The men in these companies, representing "one quarter at the least" of the regular militia companies out of which they were chosen, were selected by the field officers. New regiments made up entirely of minute companies were formed.⁹⁰ Although the intention seems to have been that each town would have one minute company, some towns-for example, Framingham, Ipswich, and Middleborough-had more than one minute company.

(2) Militia Companies. After the best men were removed to form the minute companies, there remained the large body of militia companies which had existed from the earliest days in New England. In the muster rolls they are frequently referred to as "training bands" or "companies of train." Except for older men and those who were otherwise exempt or in the Alarm List company, every man in town was required to be a member. Most of these companies are subclassified as "companies of foot," but a few are listed as "troop of horse" or "artillery company."

(3) Alarm List. This lowest level of the militia has been referred to as "a reserve organization," the last to turn out, made up of "boys and old men, the ministers and magistrates."⁹¹ In November 1775 the Alarm List was defined by the Provincial Congress as constituting "all the male persons from sixteen years of age to sixty-five, not included in that part of the militia called the training band, and exempted…from common ordinary training." Among those exempted at that particular point in the siege of Boston were Quakers, members of Congress, blacks, ministers, Harvard students, and selectmen.⁹² It seems likely from the language of this resolve that each town was intended to have one Alarm List company.

Popular thought claims April 19 as time day the minutemen marched. But such was the nature of the emergency and so high was the enthusiasm when the alarm went out, especially in the towns nearest Concord and Cambridge, that every type of company gathered, armed, and marched. Chart 3 shows the breakdown of the number and percentage of each of the three types of militia companies. If we assume that pride in being minutemen would lead the captain of a minute company to note that fact on the roll, it can be concluded that most of the muster rolls not listing the type of company were actually regular militia companies. By this reasoning, about 60 percent of the responding companies were regular militia, and 37 percent were minute companies.

Chart 3: Types of Militia Companies Involved in the Lexington Alarm

	Minute	Regular Militia	Alarm List	Type Not Given
Number of Companies	162	111	11	156
Percentage of Total (440)	36.7	25.1	2.5	35.4

 

It is significant that as many as 37 percent of the companies were minute companies. There are two reasons why this figure may be so high. First, as already noted, several towns boasted more than one minute company. Middleborough's three brings up the percentage. Of the three companies that marched from Framingham, two were minute companies. Whether this testifies to the high quality of the militiamen in these towns or to the high "militia spirit" in Massachusetts is unclear. Second, only minute companies marched from many towns situated a great distance from headquarters at Cambridge. For example, only minute companies marched from the western towns of Richmond, Lenox, Great Barrington, Northampton, Stockbridge, New Marlboro, West Springfield, Sandisfield, and Blanford. The day of march for the minute companies further illustrates this fact. Although of the total, 73 percent of the companies marched on April 19 itself, among the minute companies, 107 of the 162, or only 66 percent marched on the 19th. List One shows that the minute companies from Springfield and west marched later. For them "a minute's notice" came later than it did to the eastern towns. But with the crisis perhaps slightly less urgent, or at least farther away, and with a much larger time commitment demanded in terms of marching to and from Cambridge, these western towns decided to send only their elite company. Therefore, the figure of 37 percent minute companies is higher than one might expect.

List One details the size and composition of the companies. Analysis demonstrates the extent to which the local companies followed the guidelines of the Provincial Congress. In the resolution calling for the establishment of the minute companies, Congress had declared that the best men in the militia would be formed into companies of at least 50 privates, "who shall Equip and hold themselves in Readiness on the shortest notice from the said Committee of Safety to March to the place of Rendezvous," and that each company should have a captain and two lieutenants.⁹³ On April 21, 1775, the Committee of Safety, facing the urgent problem of reorganizing the militia, asserted that there should be not 50, but 70, privates in a company, over which would be "a captain, one lieutenant, one ensign, four sergeants, one fifer, one drummer." Realizing the impossibility of enlisting the additional privates, the Committee revised the number back down to 50.⁹⁴ Meanwhile the Provincial Congress in its plans for the creation of the new army had decided the ideal number in a company would he 100; it, too, realized that this was far too high a figure and revised it down to 59, including three officers.⁹⁵ Of the remaining 56 men, presumably four would be sergeants, and two would be fifer and drummer. The number of privates in a company again emerged as 50.

The profile of the ideal company, as projected by the Committee of Safety and the Provincial Congress, is, therefore: 1 captain; 2 lieutenants (or 1 lieutenant and 1 ensign); 4 sergeants; 1 drummer; 1 fifer; 50 privates. But the companies which marched in response to the Lexington Alarm diverged markedly from this ideal.

Chart 4 shows the organization of companies by plotting leadership strength against the number of privates. Column E represents the plan of the Provincial Congress. Columns A through D represent companies at greater than full leadership strength; columns F through M represent companies at less than full leadership strength. Columns A through E contain 290-66.1 percent-of the total companies. This means that only 33 percent of the companies were below standard in the number of officers (columns F through M).

The vast majority of companies-362 or 82.5 percent-marched with fewer than 50 privates, so that the companies were stronger at the top and weaker at the bottom than Congress intended. The category with the highest frequency is B/35-39; it has a captain, two lieutenants, four sergeants, four corporals, and 35 to 39 privates (including fife and drum). The median company is D/25-29; it has a captain, two lieutenants, six or seven sergeants and corporals, and 25 to 29 privates (including fife and drum). There is in both cases a higher number of officers and a lower number of privates than the Congress established as its ideal.

It has been suggested that the projected size of the companies in the new army was reduced to avoid the break up of geographical groups of men and also the forcing of some officers to accept reduced rank. Neither possibility would have been tolerated.⁹⁶

The companies that marched into Cambridge and Roxbury were the core of the Commonwealth's fighting force. What was its composition by rank? What were the resources with which Ward, Thomas, and the other leaders had to work? The total of 19,371 men in the data may be broken down as follows:⁹⁷

Officers	1,240
Sergeants and Corporals	2,438
Privates	15,693

 

From these figures, the following relationships can he deduced:

1. There was one leader for every four privates; the ideal was one leader for every seven privates.⁹⁸
2. There was one officer for every fifteen men; the ideal was one officer for every nineteen men.⁹⁹
3. The officers composed 6.40 percent of the men who marched; ideally the percentage should have been 5.09.¹⁰⁰
4. The sergeants and corporals composed 12.59 percent of the men who marched; ideally the percentage should have been 6.78.¹⁰¹
5. The privates composed 81.01 percent of the men who marched; ideally the percentage should have been 88.13.¹⁰²

Therefore, it can be concluded that the town militia companies were top-heavy, with more officers, twice as many sergeants and corporals, and fewer privates than the Committee of Safety and the Provincial Congress envisioned. Unless more men could be mobilized from the towns, the plan to organize companies of 59 men was unrealistic, and it has already been noted that even the men who first mobilized were reluctant to remain in camp. Again, localism was both the strength and weakness of the Massachusetts militia system.

The minute companies were more uniformly structured than the general militia companies. Although the militia system was being reorganized in April 1775, the central thrust of that reorganization had been the creation of the minutemen. How do these 160 minute companies compare with the situation illustrated by Chart 4? Chart 5 shows that these companies were obviously more tightly organized. The higher concentration of companies in Column B-84 companies or 52 percent of the total-indicated that despite the projected ideal of seven leaders, the towns actually organized companies with eleven leaders, adding four corporals. Only 16 of the companies-10.0 percent-lie in Column E., which again represents the plan of the Provincial Congress. One hundred twenty-six companies-78.8 percent-are in Columns A through E and are, therefore, at or above the level of leadership Congress wanted. The number of companies with 50 or more privates is small: only 19-11.9 percent-of the total. Both the category with the highest frequency and the category containing the median company are identical with those presented in Chart 4. Thus, although the concentration of companies in column B is greater for the minute companies than for the total companies, this has not skewed overall distribution.

Chart 6, showing the organization of the non-minuteman companies, underlines the remarkable uniformity which the minute companies achieved. While the minute companies are concentrated in Column B, and while the category with the highest frequency in Chart 6 also lies in Column B, quite fortuitously, there is no other pattern of distribution for the non-minute companies. The level of leadership strength is lower than in the minute companies: compared with 78.8 percent in Chart 5, Chart 6 shows only 58.8 percent of the companies at or above full leadership strength. (Clearly, though, even the non-minute companies were top-heavy, underscoring the facts presented above.) But the random distribution of companies in other columns makes it apparent that the militia system, apart from the minute companies, was not well organized. Chart 6 seems to indicate only chaos. It is easy to understand why, on April 26, the Committee of Safety urged that the minute companies form the nucleus of the new army.¹⁰³ Not only were the minutemen the best soldiers, but also the minute companies were the only part of the militia system that was uniformly organized. This does not mean that the men in the regular militia were poor soldiers; it does not mean that they were poorly drilled; it does not mean that they lacked the "militia spirit." It does mean that they were not organized, and, therefore, were probably less effective.

Key to Charts 4, 5, and 6

Column	Leadership Strength
A.	More officers than one captain, two lieutenants, four sergeants, four corporals.
B.	One captain, two lieutenants, four sergeants, four corporals.
C.	More than one captain and two lieutenants, but less than eight sergeants and corporals.
D.	One captain, two lieutenants, six or seven sergeants and corporals.
E.	One captain, two lieutenants, four or five sergeants and corporals.
F.	One captain, two lieutenants, one to three sergeants and corporals.
G.	One captain, one lieutenant, six to eight sergeants and corporals.
H.	One captain, one lieutenant, three to five sergeants and corporals.
I.	One captain, one lieutenant, one or two sergeants and corporals.
J.	Two or more captains, lieutenants, and ensigns, no sergeants or corporals.
K.	One captain or lieutenant, three or more sergeants and corporals.
L.	One captain or lieutenant, one or two sergeants and corporals.
M.	One commanding officer only (e.g. captain, lieutenant, or, in a few cases, sergeant).

Note: The rank of ensign is included with that of lieutenant. For simplicity, the unusual case of no captain but two lieutenants is counted as one captain and one lieutenant.

Chart 4: Comparison of Leadership Strength to Number of Private Soldiers in All Companies

Number of privates, Including Fifers and Drummers

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	Total
More than 100	3	1	1											5
60-99	3	13	1	6	3	2		2						30
55-59		6	1	3	4	3			1					18
50-54	1	10	1	6	4	1		1						24
45-49	3	15	2	7	2			2						31
40-44	1	15	3	11	6	4	5			1	1			47
35-39	5	25	4	6	3	1		6	1					51
30-34	1	19	2	9	6	5	1	7		3	1			55
25-29	4	12	1	8	11	5	3	3		1	1	3		52
20-24	2	10	2	4	9	4	9	6	3	2		1	3	55
15-19		1	1	2	5	5	2	4	3	1	2	1	2	29
10-14		1		1	3		1	9	2	3	3	4	2	29
0-9					1			3	1	1	1	4	2	13
Total	23	128	19	63	37	30	21	43	12	12	9	13	9	439

 

 

Chart 5: Comparison of Leadership Strength to Number of Private Soldiers in Minute Companies

Number of privates, Including Fifers and Drummers

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	Total
More than 100
60-99	1	5												6
55-59		2		1	3									6
50-54		6							1					7
45-49	2	12	1	1	1									17
40-44	1	14	1	4	1	1	3							25
35-39		22			1									23
30-34	1	11	1	6	1	1	1	1						23
25-29	2	8		3	5		1	1			1	1		22
20-24		4					5	2	1				1	13
15-19			1		3	1	1			1	1			8
10-14					1			4	1	1				7
0-9												3		3
Total	7	84	4	15	16	3	11	8	3	2	2	4	1	160

 

There were two reasons for the lack of organization among regular town militia companies, one of long-standing origin, the other a more recent development. The tradition of localism among New England towns produced variation in both size and organization of individual militia companies. Although statistical data are lacking, it seems clear that the Provincial Congress called for the formation of the minute companies in order to achieve some measure of uniformity from this variation. Second, ironically enough, the formation of the minute companies themselves-which involved removing a company's best men-wreaked confusion on local companies. The introduction to one muster roll no more than hints at the problems created:

A Muster Roll of a Number of men belonging to Billerica in Coll. Green's Regt. under the Command of Lieut Oliver Crosby being the Remainder of the Third Company in said Town after the inlisting the minet men who were in the Concord Bridge and afterward in the army at Cambridge the Time after mention.¹⁰⁴

Chart 6: Comparison of Leadership Strength to Number of Private Soldiers in Non-Minute Companies^a

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	Total
More than 100	3	1	1											5
60-99	2	8	1	6	3	2		2						24
55-59		4	1	2	1	3		1						12
50-54	1	4	1	6	4	1								17
45-49	1	3	1	6	1			2						14
40-44		1	2	7	5	3	2			1	1			22
35-39	5	3	4	6	2	1		6	1					28
30-34		8	1	3	5	4		6	1	3	1			32
25-29	2	4	1	5	6	5	2	2		1	2			30
20-24	2	6	2	4	9	4	4	4	2	2		1	2	42
15-19		1		2	2	4	1	4	3	2	1	1	2	21
10-14		1		1	2		1	5	1	2	3	4	2	22
0-9					1			3	1	1	1	1	2	10
Total	16	44	15	48	41	27	10	35	9	10	7	9	8	279

^{a Includes companies defined as regular militia, alarm list, and unidentified.}

If Company X had five men judged worthy to be minutemen, and if Company Y had fifteen, some of the imbalance in evidence on Chart 6 could well result.

What of the militia system's hierarchy above the company level? Rutman points out that the New England militia was not only an institution organic to the town, but also it was an organization under strong central authority. From 1635 the militia in Massachusetts was under a single commander or military council.¹⁰⁵ But, as French admits, the Lexington Alarm muster rolls show "how difficult it is to place a given company in the military system."¹⁰⁶ Since many muster rolls do not indicate the regiment to which the company belonged, it is probably impossible to piece the puzzle together. There is even confusion as to how many companies made up a regiment. The resolve establishing the organization of the minute companies called for nine companies in a regiment, yet one of the muster rolls noted that Colonel Whitcomb had thirteen companies in his regiment. Other colonels were also listed as regimental commanders by more than nine companies. Minute companies were in separate regiments from the regular militia, but the pattern of how these regiments were related is not clear. We do know that there was a colonel at the head of each regiment, minute or regular,¹⁰⁷ and a staff of field officers serving with and under him, including the ranks of lieutenant-colonel and major. Above the colonels, and often serving simultaneously as colonels themselves, were the generals.¹⁰⁸ Although with at least fifty-eight colonels in the system, the total number of high ranking officers may well have approached one hundred in Massachusetts, there is no way to ascertain which or how many of them were on duty at Cambridge or Roxbury.

Conclusion

The filing of the Lexington Alarm muster rolls by local militia company officers and their preservation by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts have given us the unique opportunity of freezing the ongoing evolution of the militia system in that colony at a particular moment. That the moment was April 19, an event of tremendous importance, makes our analysis of the size and organization of the militia system that much more significant.

The militia system in Massachusetts, although well prepared to confront the British in terms of drill and spirit, was ill prepared in terms of organization. Only the minute companies were approaching uniform organization, and even they were not set up exactly as the Provincial Congress had envisioned. The most striking feature of the companies, both minute and regular, was their full leadership strength compared with their low number of privates. At the local level the companies were top-heavy. This divergence from the will of the Congress and the Committee of Safety and the reluctance of the men to enlist in the new army at headquarters reflect the essentially town nature of the militia system. Such a combination, however, does make the comparative uniformity of the minute companies even more significant. Although a tremendous number of men were mobilized on the Alarm, they could not be organized into an army of any size. Still the threat of such organization and increased pressure from London forced General Thomas Gage to act on April 19. His decision caught the militia system in the midst of reorganization. The minute companies had formed, but the regular militia had not yet fully and uniformly reorganized. Prepared or not, though, on April 19 the militia system was in action.

One purpose in preparing the lists in this volume and in beginning their analysis is to open the Lexington Alarm muster rolls for use to other students of the period. Genealogists naturally will be interested in the lists for the information on the individuals. Historians will find the lists useful in the discussion of the role and organization of the colonial militia. Specifically, may we suggest two lines of inquiry?

First, Nancy Voye, in her recent Massachusetts Officers in the French and Indian Wars, 1748-1763 (Boston, 1975), has made available lists of names and information from muster rolls for those wars, similar to those of the present volume. This volume is, in a certain sense, a sequel to that of Voye's. Utilizing her list, researchers should be able to trace continuity of experience for individuals from the French and Indian Wars to the Revolution. How many of the militiamen who mobilized on April 19 were veterans? What was the past militia experience of the men in the present volume? We now know only about individuals-usually the famous ones. In The First Year of the American Revolution, Allen French recounted the earlier experiences of John Thomas, John Whitcomb, Joseph Frye, and other leaders, as well as a few lesser lights. One of the latter is John Nixon of Framingham, who went at age eighteen to the siege of Louisbourg and who by April 19 was captain of his company.¹⁰⁹ Local historians and genealogists no doubt know of other examples. But in order to draw definite conclusions a systematic study must be undertaken. We feel cautious about asserting a high degree of continuity at the beginning of this endeavor. As a preliminary move, using the random sample of fifty names from List Two, we checked them against the French and Indian Wars list. Only two appeared on Voye's list. This evidence is surprising and-since it has not been established that the two names which appear on both lists are, in fact, the same persons-this is not an encouraging beginning. It should he noted, however, that men who appeared on the Lexington Alarm list would have been fairly young during the French and Indian Wars, making it likely that they would not have been officers in the 1760s (Nixon is an example here). Or is it possible that the militia officers who served earlier and who were still active in the 1770s were purged as Tories in 1774, opening the way for the election of new, perhaps younger officers? Neither explanation proves anything about the effects of continuity of experience between the two periods, but, obviously, the investigation will be difficult.

A second important task would be to trace future continuity of service of the men who marched on April 19. We began this project by showing the future military service, as revealed in Massachusetts Soldiers and Sailors, of the random sample. Further information from local historians and genealogical sources is surely available. We need to know which men enlisted in the army and which stayed home, turning out with their militia companies from time to time. How many men served more or less continuously until the end of the Revolution? Is there any relationship between past militia experience and post-Lexington participation? The data here presented should aid in answering these and other questions. It thus will help to offer new insights into the military and social history of the American Revolution.

We owe to some individuals and institutions special thanks and recognition for their assistance and encouragement in helping us prepare this volume. The project was made possible by financial assistance from the Society of Colonial Wars in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. We express our appreciation to the Society and to Howard Gambrill, Jr., Historian and Chairman of the Charitable Contributions Committee. The research was done at the Massachusetts Archives, and we appreciate the assistance received there from the late Richard W. Hale, Jr., Archivist of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; Leo Flaherty, Curator of the Massachusetts Archives; and Helen Flaherty. Professor David D. Hall helped with advice along the way, and he and Professor Richard L. Bushman, both of Boston University, read the manuscript. Director James B. Bell, Associate Editor Ralph J. Crandall, and Assistant Editor Susan L. Patterson of the New England Historic Genealogical Society offered guidance and editorial assistance from the outset. Elizabeth A. Hambrick-Stowe's editorial advice in the final preparation of the manuscript was invaluable. And finally, our thanks to Helen Drew, who typed the list.

Charles F. Hambrick-Stowe
Donna D. Smerlas

Boston, Massachusetts
June 1976

FOOTNOTES:
<sup>1. Allen French, The Siege of Boston (New York, 1911), 141.
2.(Boston, 1896-1908).
3. John Shy, Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution (Princeton, N. J., 1965), 412.
4. Howard Henry Peckham, The War for Independence: A Military History (Chicago, 1958), 6.
5. French, Siege of Boston, 122.
6. Merrill Jensen, The Founding of a Nation: A History of the American Revolution, 1763-1776 (New York, 1968), 536.
7. Quoted in Shy, Toward Lexington, 411.
8. For a summary of the Resolves, see French, Siege of Boston, 130.
9. The Committee of Safety was charged "when ever they shall judge it necessary for the safety and Defence of the Inhabitants of this province and their Property against such person or persons as aforesaid [,] to alarm, muster, and cause to be assembled with the utmost expedition, compleatly armed accourtied and supplied with provision sufficient for their support in their march to the place of Rendezvous, such and so many of the Militia of this Province as they shall judge necessary for the ends aforesaid." Mass. Soldiers and Sailors, 1:ix.
10. French, Siege of Boston, 140.
11. Ibid., 148-149, and Shy, Toward Lexington, 412-415.
12. French, Siege of Boston, 154-155, and Allen French, The Day of Concord and Lexington, the Nineteenth of April, 1775 (Boston, 1925), 55.
13. Quoted in French, Siege of Boston, 144.
14. Quoted in Peckham, War for Independence, 8.
15. Originally the lines were: "Behold the Cerberus the Atlantic plough, / Her precious cargo-Burgoyne, Clinton, Howe / Bow, wow, wow!" Quoted, ibid., 15.
16. Jensen, Founding of a Nation, 567, and Allen French, The First Year of the American Revolution (New York, 1968 [orig. publ. Boston, 1934]), 42.
17. French, First Year of Revolution, 45-46.
18. Jensen, Founding of a Nation, 553.
19. French, First Year of Revolution, 37-40.
20. On Oct. 5, 1774, John Andrews noted the formation of the elite companies, "which are call'd minute men, i.e. to be ready at a minute's warning with a fortnight's provision, and ammunition and arms." French, Seige of Boston, 168.
21. Bernard Knollenberg, Origin of the American Revolution: 1759-1766 (New York, 1960), 251.
22. Quoted in Peckham, War for Independence, 7.
23. Jensen, Founding of a Nation, 584.
24. Shy, Toward Lexington, 418.
25. French, Siege of Boston, 162-164. DeBernier left his diary behind when the British evacuated Boston nearly a year later.
26. Quoted in Peckham, War for Independence, 8.
27. Knollenberg, Orgin of American Revolution, 251.
28. The militiamen employed the new style of fighting, learned from the Indians; thus, three shots hit their targets, and two were intended for the major. The old European style of fighting called for an indiscriminate firing of guns leveled, not aimed.
29. Peckham, War for Independence, 11.
30. French, Day of Concord, 215.
31. Payments were later allowed for compensation to the wounded and to the widows of those killed. See Abner C. Goodell, Jr., ed., Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay to which are prefixed the Charters of the Province (Boston, 1869-1918), vol. 19 (under "Lexington and Concord, Battle of," in index).
32. For detailed accounts of the Battle, see French, Day of Concord; Harold Murdock, The Nineteenth of April, 1775…(Boston, 1923); Richard Frothingham's classic, History of the Siege of Boston, and of the Battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill…(Boston, 1849); Frank Warren Coburn, The Battle of April 19, 1775, in Lexington, Concord, Lincoln, Arlington, Cambridge, Somerville and Charlestown, Massachusetts (Lexington, Mass., 1912); John R. Galvin, The Minute Men: A Compact History of the Defenders of the American Colonies, 1645-1775 (New York, 1967); Arthur Bernon Toutellot, Lexington and Concord: The Beginning of the War of the American Revolution (New York, 1963 [orig. publ. as William Diamond's Drum (1959)]); and Robert A. Gross, The Minutemen and Their World (New York, 1976). French, Day of Concord, 258, has the figure of 3,500.
33. French, Day of Concord, 22.
34. Ibid., 24. The usual time was at least one day longer.
35. Muster Rolls of Mobilization, XII: 33, Massachusetts State Archives, State House, Boston.
36. Ibid., XI: 194.
37. French, First Year of Revolution, 29.
38. To appreciate the awesomeness of the militia surrounding Boston and the unprecedented nature of Gage's predicament, compare the number 20,000 with other mass gatherings in British history. Peter Laslett, The World We Have Lost (London, 1967), 261, notes that "Cromwell commanded 26,000 or 27,000 men at Marston Moor, and this must have been one of the largest organized crowds ever to have assembled before Napoleonic times in England. The greatest strength of the armed forces was 70,000 for a brief period under the Commonwealth."
39. This is the number of distinct names in the muster rolls. Since many rolls do not give the colonel's name, there could be more than 58. See p. xxxix, n. 37, for a list.
40. French, First Year of Revolution, 26-27.
41. Muster Rolls, XIII: 86.
42. The company of Capt. William Draper, for example, was granted such permission on May 3. Ibid., XII: 50.
43. French, First Year of Revolution, 62.
44. Ibid., 62.
45. Mass. Soldiers and Sailors, 1: xii-xiii. But a resolution for the pay of the soldiers was not passed until May 4.
46. This 21 percent is substantially the same 20 percent that stayed in camp for at least 22 days (see chart 1).
47. For instance, Col. Thomas Gardner gave orders to Capt. John Parker of Lexington that read: "Cambridge 4 May. Sir: It is the desire of the Committee of Safety that you march one half of your company forthwith to Cambridge to parade before the church meeting house, and to pursue such orders as you shall receive from the General from time to time." Muster Rolls, XIII: 61.
48. Jensen, Founding of a Nation, 588.
49. Mass. Soldiers and Sailors, 1:xii.
50. Quoted in French, First Year of Revolution, 50.
51. Ibid., 51.
52. Ibid., 52.
53. Peckham, War for Independence, 27.
54. Mass. Soldiers and Sailors, 11:872.
55. Coburn published a supplement to his Battle of April 19, giving the lists of companies and names of men involved in the fighting. He noted, "Of all the participating companies, as I have given them, there were but ten that filed no claim for services rendered…two from Acton, two from Brookline, the four from Concord, and the one from Lexington."
56. French, First Year of Revolution, 721, accepted this explanation, citing George Talman, The Concord Minute Men…(Concord, Mass., 1901).
57. "No Yankee ever served for nothing…Serve for little he often did…but his pay was his pay, even for the glorious Nineteenth of April." French, First Year of Revolution, 61.
58. Muster Rolls, XIII: 173.
59. Ibid., XII: 1.
60. Ibid., 3.
61. Ibid., 42.
62. Goodell, ed., Acts and Resolves, 19:148.
63. Muster Rolls, XIII:2.
64. Goodell, ed., Acts and Resolves, 19:448. These figures agreed with the pay sacale passed in Congress in April 1774. See Muster Rolls, XIII:23.
65. French, First Year of Revolution, 721-722, gave the pay scale for higher ranking officers (all per lunar month): Colonel, £15; Lt. Colonel, £12; Adjutant, £5.10; Chaplain, £6; Surgeon, £7.10; Surgeon's Mate, £4. On Jan. 25, 1776, the generals were voted the following pay, again per lunar month: Ward, £21; Thomas, £18; Whitcomb, Heath, Frye, and Pomeroy, £16 each.
66. Muster Rolls, XIII:107.
67. Ibid., 23.
68. Goodell, ed., Acts and Resolves, 19:448.
69. Muster Rolls, XIII: 156, 185, 186.
70. Ibid., 134, 136.
71. Darrett B. Rutman, "A Militant New World" (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1959), iii.
72. Ibid.. 745, 754, 750. Unlike New England, where militia officers were elected locally, Virginia's officers were appointed.
73. Sumner Chilton Powell, Puritan Village: The Formation of a New England Town (Middletown, Conn., 1963), 114-115; Powell does not, however, discuss the militia in depth; other recent studies of New England town life-Philip J. Greven, Jr., Four Generations: Population, Land, and Family in Colonial Andover, Massachusetts (Ithaca, N.Y., 1970), and Kenneth A. Lockridge, A New England Town, The First Hundred Years: Dedham, Massachusetts, 1636-1736 (New York, 1970), for example-virtually ignore the militia as an institution.
74. Shy, Toward Lexington, 9.
75. T. H. Breen, "English Origins and New World Development: The Case of the Covenanted Militia in Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts," Past and Present, 57 (1972): 74-86. See also Daniel J. Boorstin's discussion of the place of the militia in colonial society in The Americans: The Colonial Experience (New York, 1958), 341-372.
76. See the Diary of Peter Thacher. 1678-1782, 1682-1699, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston. References to the diary, however, are to the typescripts on deposit at the Mass. Hist. Soc., too. See esp. 1:12, 35, 50-51, 64-65, 86, 142, 180, 198, 213, 217, 237, 240, 254; 2:17, 18, 42.
77. Rutman, "Militant New World," 754. See also Peter Thacher, The Saints' Victory and Triumph over Sin and Death…(Boston, 1696), a sermon first preached at the Boston Artillery Company election.
78. Shy, Toward Lexington, 9.
79. Ola Elizabeth Winslow, Meetinghouse Hill (New York, 1952), 289-290. Winslow's quotation from Wilford J. Litchfield's copy of the Diary of Deacon Israel Litchfield, on deposit at the New England Historic Genealogical Society, Boston illustrates vividly the role of the minister in the enlistment process in Scituate, Mass., in January 1775.
80. Rutman, "Militant New World," 745. Rutman actually saw little continuity between English and colonial militias, besides a similarity of terms-the colonial words "train," "companies of train," or "training hands" are holdovers from the "trained bands" of armed militia of medieval times. He argued, instead, that "to preserve themselves, what they had, and what they hoped to have some day, the colonists had built their militia structure, built it on their own." Ibid., 756. Powell, Puritan Village, 114-115, also emphasizes the uniqueness of the militia in America. In American Puritanism: Faith and Practice (Philadelphia, 1970), however, Rutman argued the case for continuity of the New England life with that of England. T. H. Breen. "Covenanted Militia," Past and Present, 57 (1972): 76-83, has outlined the development of the militia in England from the 1550s to the 1630s.
81. Rutman, "Militant New World," 745.
82. Breen, "Convenanted Militia," Past and Present, 57 (1972): 92-94, promotes a declension theory of 17th-century militia history, based on the 1668 decision of the General Court to take over from the towns "full authority to 'nominate, choose, and appoint' commission officers." Even after 1675, when the Court began at least asking the town militia committees to recommend names, Breen contends that the local initiative could not be recovered. "Unless these men solicited the opinions of rank and file soldiers, and there is little evidence that they did, there was no way villagers could influence the choice of trainband officers." Breen is wrong, however, in suggesting that the early vitality of the militia as a town institution was lost. The Reverend Thacher recorded the election of officers in Boston companies around the year 1680 and the nomination of officers by the company in Milton. Diary, 1:213; 2:42. The image of the local militia company one finds in this diary is not the institution in decline which Breen describes, but one that is alive and well at the town level. In this light and by the evidence of 1774-1775, it can be concluded that the militia retained its essentially town nature and that it remained vital throughout the colonial period. A closer study of the militia of the late 17th and early 18th centuries is needed.
83. Piers MacKesy, The War for America, 1775-1783 (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), 31-32.
84. John W. Shy, "A New Look at the Colonial Militia," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d Ser., 20 (1963): 183-185.
85. Quoted in French, Day of Concord, 45.
86. Shy, Toward Lexington, 373-424; "the decision of 1763" is the title of the second chapter of this book.
87. Quoted in MacKesy, War For America, 32.
88. Ibid.
89. Shy, Toward Lexington, 377.
90. Mass. Soldiers and Sailors, 1:ix.
91. French, First Year of Revolution, 41.
92. Goodell, ed., Acts and Resolves, 5:451.
93. Mass. Soldiers and Sailors, 1: ix.
94. French, First Year of Revolution, 56-57.
95. Mass. Soldiers and Sailors, 1: xii-xiii.
96. French, First Year of Revolution, 57-58. French is correct, but serving at a lower rank was not unknown. Joseph Morse's Natick company roll shows three men with some claim to the rank of captain, two lieutenants, and one ensign all serving as volunteers among the privates. Muster Rolls, XIII: 8.
97. "Officers" included captains, first and second lieutenants, ensigns, and four doctors and ministers; "sergeants and corporals" included 28 clerks; "privates" included 373 fifers and drummers.
98. Men with any rank at all were compared with privates:
3678 1
________= _________
15693 privates 4.27
The projected ideal was 7 leaders for 52 privates, or 1
_____
7.43
99. Officers with a rank of ensign through captain were compared with men with a rank of sergeant or less:</sup>
1240 officers 1
__________ = ________
18131 men 14.62
The projected idea was 3 officers for every 56 men, or ___1____
18.67
<sup>100. Officers with a rank of ensign through captain were compared with the total number of men who marched:
1240 officers
= 6.40%
19371 men
The projected ideal was 3 officers for every 59 men, or 5.09 percent.
101. Men with a rank of sergeant or corporal were compared with the total number of men who marched:
2438 sgts./cpls.
= 12.59%
19371 men
The projected ideal was 4 sergeants for every 59 men, or 6.78 percent.
102. Privates were compared with the total number of men who marched:
15693 pvts.
= 81.01%
19371 men
The projected ideal was 52 privates for a company of 59 men, or 88.13 percent.
103. Mass. Soldiers and Sailors, 1:xii.
104. Muster Rolls, XII: 16.
105. Rutman, "Militant New World," 752.
106. French, First Year of Revolution, 721.
107. The following are the colonels identified in the muster rolls and, in parentheses, the number of companies naming each as colonel of their regiment: Arnold (2); John Bailey (7); John Baker (4); James Barrett (2); Samuel Bodwell, Major (1); Ebenezer Bridge (5); John Bullard (1); Samuel Bullard (3); Theophilus Cotton (5); Caleb Cushing (2); John Daggett (6); Timothy Danielson (4); Davis (1); Aaron Davison (1); Ephraim Doolittle (9); John Fellows (9); Jedidiah Foster (1); James Frye (7); Thomas Gardner (5); Samuel Gerrish (2); John Greaton (5): David Green (13); William Heath (7); Ezekiel How (1); Samuel Johnson (9); Tristram Jordan (2); Larned [Learned, Leonard?] (2); Learnard [Learned, Leonard?] (1); Ebenezer Learned (6); Nathaniel Leonard (1); Benjamin Lincoln (10); Isaac Merriell (1); Edwin Mitchell (2); Moulton (1); Joseph Otis (1); Moses Parker, Lt. Col. (1); John Patison [Patterson, Peterson?] (1); John Paterson (1); John Patterson (5); John Peterson [Patterson?] (1); Timothy Pickering (2); Abijah Pierce (5); Seth Pomeroy (3); Elisha Porter (2); James Prescott (9); William Prescott (6); Pyncheon (4); Pynchon (1); Paul Raymond, Major (1); Lemuel Robinson (1); Paul Dudley Sargent (1); John Smith (9); Nathan Sparhawk (4); Anthony Thomas (4); Warren (1); Artemus Ward (2); Jonathan Ward (4); Silas Wheelock (2); Asa Whitcomb (11); John Whitcomb (10); Samuel Williams (6); and Benjamin Ruggles Woodbridge (8).
108. French, First Year of Revolution, 720, discusses the first generals.
109. Ibid.. 34-35.</sup>

CITATION INFORMATION:
Massachusetts Militia Companies and Officers in the Lexington Alarm (Online database: NewEnglandAncestors.org, New England Historic Genealogical Society, 2002), (Orig. Pub. by The Society of Colonial Wars in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, The New England Historic Genealogical Society, and The Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Archives Division, Boston, MA. Charles E. Hambrick-Stowe and Donna D. Smerlas, editors. Massachusetts Militia Companies and Officers in the Lexington Alarm, 1976).